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The German Elections—Meaning and Impact

by Sigmund Neumann

World affairs are moving fast these days. In fact, they may well have reached a new critical phase. Stalin's death and Beria's fall; upheavals in satellite states; the diplomacy to follow the Korean truce; inconclusive Italian election returns; France's persistent cabinet maladies and Bonn's economic boom; Western foreign ministers' declarations and the possibility of a new four-power conference—to mention only a few news items—may all add up to a thawing of the petrified cold war fronts.

Are empires crumbling and loosing their grip? Is this the end of the exclusive control of the two superpower protagonists and the reassertion of new political forces? Or is it a mere reshuffle of fronts in what has become an international civil war?

Any clue is welcome to a deeply disturbed world. Elections can serve as such a seismograph of an inarticulate public opinion; and if they occur in nations that are at the centers of world unrest, they may register a crucial reaction.

The West German Bundestag elections of September 6 are to be held under such auspices. The world is eagerly awaiting their

outcome. Yet the very fact that the *Land der Mitte* is lying at the crossroads of great international movements makes Germany sensitive to their unpredictable events and deeply affects the nation's basic decisions.

For example, the heroic East German upheaval of June 17 seems to have changed the German picture overnight. Before June 17 the integration of the Federal Republic into the European Defense Community, ratified by the Bonn parliament, seemed assured, and all-German unity appeared to be beyond reach. Following the June 17 rising the prospects of an early unification (by Russian default or Allied intervention) have suddenly soared, and the plans of European union have experienced an unexpected setback. Equally, a complete reversal may be noticed in respect to the chances for West German rearmament within the framework of NATO, and neutralism seems to have found a renewed impetus. Does this change also offer new opportunities for a neo-Nazi challenge to a weak democracy?

Under these circumstances, can the government of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer expect the return of a working majority or will the

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Social Democratic opposition take advantage of its consistently nationalist line and win a controlling position in the new parliament?

How can one judge accurately the Reich's electoral prospects in view of the daily turmoil of world events, hitting the nation from East and West? Add to these international imponderables the intricacies of Germany's political landscape—with its multiparty agglomerations of unpronounceable names and undefinable aims—and it looks indeed like a foolhardy undertaking to venture any meaningful prediction.

And yet one of the most surprising features of the German parties is their relative stability* in program, membership and problems, especially if one ignores the insignificant splinter groups and concentrates on the major political forces.

Persistent Party Traits

The German party system has been characterized by two major facts: emphasis on *Weltanschauung* (philosophy of life) and strict class alignments. Both features have been evident since the birth of the parties and indeed are rooted in their peculiar origin. The political movements, originating in an atmosphere that did not permit responsible participation in the monarchical autocracy of Prussia-Germany, have not yet fully recovered from these fatal beginnings.

In the fight for or against the principles of the French Revolution the cleavages of opinion crystallized into ideological camps long before the German parties were called to serve

their proper function of policy-decision agents. In the meantime the partisans prided themselves on an almost religious adherence to a fundamental program; it made them deride Anglo-American party systems, with their loose and often noncommittal party platforms.

This rigidity has remained the main feature of German politics. It has consequently been difficult, if not impossible, to accept compromise as the appropriate technique for adjusting the divergent aims of the political contestants. The Germans take their politics religiously—if they take them at all; and the elections emphasize this rigidity.

These difficulties of the German *Weltanschauungsparteien* were accentuated by a second characteristic—namely, their close connection with definite social classes. In a complex society, such as that of late 19th-century Germany, class affiliations of inflexible political groups encouraged the development of a multiparty system, which represented another stumbling block for responsible governments. Such social alignments also limited the flexibility of the electorate until our day.

Not even the shock of the Nazi regime could destroy the stable cadres of the political parties. They re-emerged after 1945 (in some tactical camouflage of new nomenclature and in temporary political shelters, to be sure) in almost the same strength with which they had gone underground, with the same programs, the same leaders—only they were now 13 years older.

No doubt, there have been some

changes on Germany's internal political map, and they will have to be marked in; but the radical transformation which many planners—theoreticians and politicians alike—have been dreaming about has not come yet, if it ever will. Like French cabinet crises, German election campaigns seem to indicate a major upheaval, yet the outcome often represents a mere reshuffle of the same forces.

Election Forecasts

Based on such relative stability of political fronts one may venture some election forecasts. In all probability the returns will show a very close race.

It is conceivable that the Social Democratic party may win the most votes. No doubt, it will increase its following considerably beyond its 29.2 percent showing in the first Bundestag election of 1949. The intervening Laender elections, especially in 1950-51, indicated such a shift to the party, which, as the voice of opposition, has made effective use of critical issues such as rearmament, economic dissatisfaction, bureaucratic mismanagement and, above all, the ever-present urge for national unity. Yet 35 percent seems to be the magic figure beyond which the Social Democratic party cannot grow (except, of course, in the event that Eastern Germany with its stronger Socialist following should be incorporated into a united Reich).

A similar electoral limitation affects the ruling Christian Democrats. Some optimistic party forecasters expect another plurality (the

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Christian Democrats, with 31 percent of the total vote in 1949, led all other parties), but a recent prediction by the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* that the party will poll 38 percent of the ballot seems unrealistically high. A careful comparison of the party's electoral record with its appreciable losses in 1950-51 and some recovered strength in the 1952 elections suggests that the Christian Democrats may equal the Social Democrats or trail them slightly.

The most interesting phenomenon—to be watched with circumspection—will be the strength of Adenauer's coalition partners, especially the Free Democratic party. In fact, this group represents the main alternative for disappointed Christian Democratic voters of Protestant and nationalist fervor. Much of the Free Democrats' future policy will depend on the inner balance of its conflicting factions. This party of liberal *Bundespräsident* Theodor Heuss has increasingly come under the dominance of its right wing and such articulate spokesmen as Dr. Friedrich Middelhaue.

Right-wing Gains

In the meantime it may be assumed that the right-wing coalition parties will more than hold their own and possibly gain considerably. It is this shift within the present governmental coalition which may be the most momentous outcome of the elections. The Free Democratic party may unite under its banner up to 15 percent of the vote (11.9 percent in 1949). Its neighbor to the right, the German party, which under its ambitious leader, Hans-Christoph Seebohm, desperately tries to become the conservative center, will recruit only a relatively small number but, thanks to its regional strength in Lower Saxony, may attain a parliamentary representation of a crucial 3 to 5 percent. The latter's strength

will largely depend on the fate of the remaining political groups on the right wing.

There is first of all the Union of the Homeless, which strongly appeals to the 10 million expellees from the East. Without representation in the first Bundestag, it has shown in the following elections a surprising staying power of a 10 percent national average. With such an expected percentage it may in fact become a balancing power in parliament.

New Electoral Law

The chances of numerous splinter groups have been minimized by the new electoral law. Passed by the Bundestag late this June, and after a bitter debate even among the coalition partners, it may in fact be declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court before the national elections. It aims at a qualified proportional representation by giving each citizen two votes, one to be applied directly in his electoral district, the other to be accounted for on a regional list. An equal number of representatives, 484 altogether, will be elected through the two procedures, yet only parties which succeed in winning a mandate in at least one district or which command 5 percent of the national vote will be permitted their proportional share on the regional lists. The result will be the elimination of almost all the 60-odd splinter groups currently active in Western Germany. Of the smaller parties, regionally strong organizations such as the German party and the Bavarian party will survive, and so will those that can make electoral agreements with a major party in certain districts—for a price. Such arrangements may be made between the small Rhenish Center party (Zentrum) and the Christian Democrats in a few constituencies.

As to the radical parties, the Com-

munists may be easily excluded from parliamentary representation altogether under the 5 percent rule. The right-wing opposition, however, may overcome the handicap of its innumerable splinter parties by a last minute combination of most of them under the heading of the newly created National Union (Nationale Sammlung). It would not be surprising if such a newly activated nationalist Right competed successfully for a good part of the followers who had found a temporary home in the Free Democratic and German parties. Thus its representation may swell to a weighty 10 percent.

It is in this camp that, under diverse, ambitious and confused leaders, a neo-Nazi movement has come into the open. Its present-day spokesmen, such as August Hausleiter, will probably be pushed aside by more purposeful, unscrupulous and demagogic leaders; and this movement, like the outlawed Socialist Reich party of General Otto Remer, may be but a prelude to greater threats to the young democracy.

Post-election Government

No doubt it is too early to tell whether a genuine democratic spirit has permeated Germany. Indicative though numerical strength is, especially under the democratic rules of the game, neither the 80 percent majority for the "democratic" parties in the first Bundestag nor the noisy reappearance of radical groups can give an adequate measure of the underlying trends. In fact, if anything is alarming in the inner political scene, it is not so much the actual or prospective increase of the right-wing parties themselves as the continuous pressure that they exercise on the predominant moderate parties. Eager to counteract their rivals and compete with them for public support, they may easily become the

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How Should the U.S. Tell Its Story Overseas?

by Edward L. Bernays

Mr. Bernays, a leading American publicist, served with the U.S. Committee on Public Information in World War I. Recently he was called upon by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as an expert witness on overseas information programs. He is the author of *Crystallizing Public Opinion*, *Propaganda* and *Public Relations*.

THE overseas information programs of the State Department are trying to win the hearts and minds of millions of the world's inhabitants for the basic principles for which America stands.

Should we support and strengthen these programs or change them? Do these programs say the right things at the right time to the appropriate people through effective media to accomplish our objectives?

It would be an oversimplification to answer these questions categorically. These official overseas information programs of the United States cannot be considered by themselves alone. They are too intimately related to other factors in our national policy and processes to admit of such easy treatment.

Relationship with Policy

We must consider them in the entire setting if we are to discuss or deal with the problem effectively.

We need first of all to appraise two factors: (1) the relations of the programs to top-level government policy, (2) the requirements for a successful offensive on behalf of our country and for counterattack against Communist propaganda.

(1) For overseas information programs to be effective we need a vigorous, clear-cut, consistent foreign policy, in harmony with the goals of the free world to be based on our national traditions and geared to the hopes and aspirations of the free world. This policy must be enunciated boldly and simply by top leadership of the United States. Our leadership should enlist the support of our

people and of Congress for this program of the United States. Our overseas information programs can then say what we mean and show by what we do that we mean it.

Activity of this kind must be coordinated with top-level policy and action of our government. It cannot be treated as something apart. It should not be a segment of any one department. It must, however, work closely with diplomacy, often supplementing it.

While consistent national policies clearly defined and effectively carried out are basic, we must, of course, also define our goals in each target area and must ensure that our national policy gets through to them. Overseas information programs must follow the broad lines of our policies and practices and thus make them more powerful.

Answering Communism

(2) The second factor governing our program is that it should have two functions: (a) an offensive for democracy — to intensify confidence in the United States among our friends, to convert neutrals to our side and to weaken our enemy, and (b) a counterattack on Communist propaganda, a defensive action against Soviet attacks on us that use falsification, distortion and deception. We must in the national interest defeat and deflate false statements circulated to the effect that we are warmongers, imperialists, monopolists.

When we have a well-defined foreign policy, an integrated organization will be needed to carry on the

information programs. This organization will report to the world activities that confirm policies of the United States. These facts about us will defeat the propaganda aimed against us. This organization will also have to conduct propaganda to nail the Soviet's lies.

Such an effort is vital to our survival. It will supplement our economic, military and diplomatic strength.

Communications and persuasion are not simply matters of telling people what we think they should know. It is a complex process of translating ideas into deeds and actions that will be accepted and approved.

Policy and words must go hand in hand. Information alone is not always persuasive.

People who doubt our deeds will not heed our words. But if our foreign policy is in keeping with our national tradition and geared to the free world, a program of information can intensify favorable attitudes, win over those who are on the fence and negate enemy attacks.

Impact of Domestic Affairs

We must also keep in mind that our domestic policies may affect foreign attitudes. Our total impact on foreign countries depends on many diverse elements — on what foreign visitors report back home, on our ambassadors and other official personnel, on unofficial utterances and practices of private American citizens everywhere, on the relations of American businessmen to their for-

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by Edward W. Barrett

Mr. Barrett, who now heads his own public relations agency, was director of overseas operations of the Office of War Information during World War II. He served as editorial director of *Newsweek* magazine, returning to Washington as Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs in 1950. He is author of a recent book, *Truth Is Our Weapon*.

IF WE are to use international persuasion ("propaganda" if you must) effectively, we must recognize one elementary point at the outset. It is essential that we forego the sort of incredible inanities that have been tolerated in recent months.

Naturally, I do not refer to any of the responsible, constructive efforts of the Administration. I refer to the sort of childish and irresponsible carnival that has been tolerated, condoned and almost encouraged.

Need for Constructive Effort

Let's be blunt. It is utter nonsense to have our psychological strategy reviewed by novices before television cameras while Soviet diplomats take notes; to permit naive headline-hunters to frighten us into strident international name calling; and to acquiesce in loud-mouthed charges of "sabotage" without having proof of a single case. The international reputation of the United States will not easily recover from the spectacle of having its officialdom issue 11 successive revisions of a book directive originally drafted by a panel of distinguished, trusted citizens—and all in a fruitless effort to appease a critic of dubious repute. It will not easily overcome the effect of a couple of brash youngsters bearing formal credentials and kiting about Europe in a flamboyant "investigation" of veteran American officials.

So far, the responsible work of the President's Committee on International Information, of the Hickenlooper Senate Committee and of the President himself have been lost in this maze of nonsense. That will con-

tinue until Mr. Eisenhower himself acts.

What can he do? Simply reflect publicly the views he has often indicated privately. He can state, in a message to Congress, that international persuasion and psychological strategy constitute difficult, sensitive work demanding the best constructive efforts of responsible men in the executive and legislative branches. He can reaffirm his statement of January: "When this branch so conducts itself as to require policing by another branch of government, it invites its own disorder and confusion." Then he can formally request congressional committees which have information (or even suspicions) about international information work to forego public spectacles and turn their material over to responsible executives in the Administration.

The President can well go one step further: He can persuade the Congress to set up one special Joint Committee on International Information to exercise Congress' responsibilities in this field and to cooperate with the Administration in developing a constructive program of international persuasion.

Guiding Principles

That is to me the *sine qua non*. With that out of the way, the government can get down to serious business. In doing so, it should recognize certain guiding principles. Long experience, plus some systematic hindsight, convince me that those guiding principles should include these points:

1. Propaganda operations alone can accomplish little. They can be

enormously effective when closely meshed with specific actions, clear policies, and grand strategy. A completely free-wheeling propaganda operation could be worse than none.

2. Propaganda operations cannot be used as substitutes for diplomatic, economic and military measures without destroying confidence and good will. Bluff does not pay off.

3. In any official, open United States government information output abroad, truth is the indispensable ingredient. Only factual honesty builds the confidence that is necessary for long-term effectiveness.

4. It should be standard government policy to have specialists in foreign opinion participate in all decisions that are made on international policy. The United States will sometimes need to be firm, even "tough," with its allies. It never needs to do so in a way that uselessly irritates them. Continuing attention to foreign opinion can prevent this.

5. Exactly where information operations are located in the government hierarchy is to me less important than it is to many. What we must remember is that the agency conducting international persuasion cannot be set apart in some watertight compartment. It should be meshed in at every level with those officials who are making and carrying out international policies.

6. In addition, it is urgent that the organization, wherever located, be given enough status and enough decent-salaried jobs to attract and hold an adequate number of first-rate executives. This has not been true to date.

7. It is futile to try to specify world-wide tactics to be followed in all areas. One should not even attempt a universal rule about proportions of straight information and of persuasive material. In one satellite nation sharp and deft radio com-

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eign employees. And of course irresponsible or unwise actions by important Americans will hurt our cause.

Our overseas information program should be centralized as an independent office under the President and the National Security Council. It should be coordinated and integrated with all the departments of our government whose activities relate to foreign affairs. Our present overlapping, duplicating, contradicting and competing foreign information efforts should be gathered together, weeded out and centralized in this new body. This centralized bureau should be free of politics and burdened with as little bureaucracy and red tape as possible. The National Security Council will make sure that there is coordination with top-level national policy makers.

Today's organization in overseas information programs is hamstrung by indecision, contradiction, duplication. Its personnel has little concept of the broad implications of the job.

It is also handicapped by technical shortcomings. An expert in mass persuasion, with the training and personality to cope with the complicated problems involved, should head the organization.

Fundamentally, the effectiveness of any national organization will depend on our leadership position in the free world and not on the quantity of words we shoot out. Our words and actions must be integrated with one another. An order by President Eisenhower for \$15 million worth of food for East Germans spoke clearly for the free world. If our national policies and deeds are honestly and strongly presented through official and nonofficial channels, we can win the cold war and the peace.

Barrett

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mentaries exposing the Communist hoax are effective. In another, they tend to be resented, but straight factual information about free world strength and determination is effective. Comment that delights Czechs

can offend Chinese. Humor that amuses Hungarians can fall flat in the Ukraine.

8. Precise tactics in international persuasion can best be mapped out and executed by capable men in the countries concerned — or (in the case of inaccessible areas) as near as possible to the countries concerned. Too much master-minding from Washington is an evil. Broad objectives for each country should be laid out in Washington. Detailed programming should be left to the field, where the information chief should be one of the three top-ranking officials immediately under the Ambassador.

One basic point should be emphasized again: Americans cannot conduct this sort of operation if it is to be pulled up by the roots and publicly dissected every few months by countless congressional groups. If, on the other hand, the Congress will set up one permanent, responsible, well-staffed committee to work continually on this problem with the executive branch, then very real progress can and will be made.



FOREIGN POLICY SPOTLIGHT

After the Truce

With the signing of an armistice agreement in Korea on July 27, the United States faces one of the trickiest double-barreled political and diplomatic problems it has encountered since the end of World War II. It must undertake a task often postponed—making specific decisions on Far Eastern policy—and it must do so despite domestic disagreements in this sensitive field and while under fire from friend and foe alike.

Paragraph 60 of the truce agreement, accepted by the UN command and the Communists as far back as

February 1952, states that the military negotiators on both sides recommend to their governments the holding of a political conference "at a higher level . . . to settle . . . the question of the withdrawal of all foreign forces, a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc." within three months of the signing of the armistice.

A Big 'Etc.'

Two years of hard and tortuous bargaining at Panmunjom have foretold enough of the difficulties of

reaching accord on the withdrawal of troops or on the future of Korea, and little imagination is necessary to foresee the disputes that can hinge on the term "etc." This minute Latin abbreviation provides only flimsy camouflage for such explosive issues as the recognition and admission to the UN of Communist China, the disposition of Formosa, Communist warfare in Indochina and Malaya and even Russian and Chinese views on the Japanese peace treaty.

Not only is the agenda of the post-truce political conference — which

should begin by the end of October—currently undecided, but so are its participants, its character, its site and its duration. The United Nations General Assembly, which recessed in April while awaiting signature of the armistice, is to reconvene August 17 to tackle these outstanding points, all of which may prove contentious.

Among the participants of the conference will be the United States, the Republic of Korea, the North Korean regime, the Communist Chinese—and who else? The 15 other UN members who made contributions to the battle against Communist aggression? The Soviet Union, which furnished military supplies, moral support and diplomatic backing, all vital, to the North Korean and Chinese effort? Nationalist China? Japan? Any “neutrals”? How extensive will the agenda be? Will the conference have a deadline? Can it achieve a real Far Eastern settlement?

The answers to these questions will come only as the preparations for the meeting and its proceedings unfold. Meanwhile, Washington's views on some of the issues are known. The security of the Republic of Korea is a dominant Western aim, coupled with the hope that the peninsula can be unified under a free and independent government. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated on July 21 that admission of Red China to the UN was not an appropriate question for the post-truce conference on Korea. He re-emphasized this view on July 28 when he said he was not prepared to buy the unity of Korea at the price of admitting Peiping to the UN, particularly to the Security Council. Nonetheless he indicated that the United States would press other non-Korean issues, those of Communist activities in Indochina and Malaya. In this regard he referred to President Eisen-

hower's April 16 speech and the declaration of the Western Big Three foreign ministers, both of which pointed out that a Korean settlement that released Communist Chinese forces for aggression elsewhere would be unacceptable.

Moreover, on July 17 Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. Robertson, reporting on his conferences with South Korean President Syngman Rhee, declared that it had been agreed that “if it were obvious that the Communists were not negotiating in good faith, we would try to end the conference as a sham and a trick.” While this does not commit Washington to support Korean desires for drastic action if the meeting fails to achieve results in 90 days, it is a pledge to avoid the inconclusive marathon debates that Communists are adept at inspiring.

If Washington can achieve these goals—the unification and security of an independent Korea and peace in Indochina and Malaya at a relatively short conference that conveniently ignores Communist China's demands for recognition and sovereignty over Formosa—then a truly magnificent victory will have been won.

Communist Demands

Unfortunately, the Korean war—even though it successfully repelled aggression—is now halted at a stalemate as far as the broad political aspirations of its contestants are concerned. Therefore, it will hardly be surprising if the Chinese Communists open their case at the conference with their own maximum demands—recognition and entry into the UN, the abdication of Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa and guarantees for the continued existence of a Communist North Korea. They, for their part, may well choose to ignore Indochina and Malaya.

From this point onward, settle-

ment will only be possible as each side gives ground. And it may well be that divisive tendencies both among the Western powers and among the Communist bloc will prove crucial in determining what compromises are possible.

Now that hostilities have ceased, the United States will be under increasing pressure from its allies to offer some concessions on the recognition issue, although not necessarily to capitulate Formosa and a seat on the Security Council to Peiping in one big package. The debate over whether diplomatic recognition constitutes approval has a pedantic ring, but United States reluctance to hand Communist China the power of the veto and a strong claim to Formosa is readily understandable on concrete political grounds. Western diplomats have suggested ingenious solutions—such as finding a place for two Chinas in the UN—but it will require considerable willingness to compromise before anything of this nature, requiring revision of the UN Charter, proves possible.

Even if Mr. Dulles should get support for the view that the conference on Korea is not the place for these questions, the American representatives are going to be asked by their friends in private and their enemies in public when and where the matter is to be discussed. Before the truce British observers were already arguing that the Korean war has proved that Peiping could not, in fact, shoot its way into the UN, since admission was effectively denied while the guns were going off. What is to happen, they ask, now that the point has been established?

Paradoxically, the American case for nonrecognition will also be weakened by the presence of the Chinese Communists at one international gathering they have managed to shoot their way into—the post-armistice conference itself. Galling as it

may be to many Americans—and especially to Congress, which has expressed unanimous will against recognition — a Korean settlement is only feasible through diplomatic intercourse with the government that effectively controls the Chinese “volunteer” army and the Yalu River border. Foreigners can readily ask, How is it possible to hold the Chinese Communists responsible for observance of a Korean peace when diplomatic communications have to be funneled through intermediaries?

While Western differences on Far Eastern policies are well enough known, the uneasy progress toward a peace can be expected to reveal rifts in the Communist camp. The interests of the Soviet Union, Communist China and North Korea are not identical, and the stresses of war must have made the divergences obvious to each party. No matter what the Peiping and Moscow radios may say, Communist power in Asia has bloodied head, hip and thigh attempting to conquer all of Korea. The West can hope that this lesson will contribute something to the peace of the world.

WILLIAM W. WADE

(Mr. Wade, former associate editor of the FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN, is serving as acting editor while Mrs. Vera Micheles Dean is in India. Mrs. Dean will report on her Indian visit in this space in later issues.)

Neumann

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prisoners of a renewed radical nationalist fervor.

These dangers may already become effective in the attempts at establishing a stable government after the elections.

What are the possible alternatives? The chances are that the returns will give the present coalition a renewed though slim majority. They may hand over the mandate to the Social Democratic opposition although this is hardly conceivable, even if the Social Democrats win the backing of some smaller parties. It is finally possible that the results will be inconclusive with no clear-cut majority.

New Pressures

If the first solution materializes, it may still be assumed that the shifting weight of the present coalition partners will become a major concern to Dr. Adenauer, who may be in need of added support from the Union of the Homeless and the Bavarian party. His rightist colleagues will put increasing pressures on his policies and in this way may assume a disproportionate share of power (even more so than they presently possess). Specifically the Free Democrats may demand as a price for continued alliance the foreign ministry for one of

their leaders, in order to guarantee a more “national” policy line.

Such a threat will become more effective if the parties of the right have a political alternative. It is with such strategy in mind that the Free Democrats together with the Union of the Homeless may even play with the idea of an alliance with the Social Democrats under the slogan of “national unity.” While such a coalition is questionable in view of traditional cleavages and well-entrenched party lines, its mere threat will suffice to strengthen the hands of Adenauer’s “nationalist” partners. Even if the Chancellor, who has become a European statesman of the first order, survives a major onslaught of this kind, the political climate of the Second Republic will have changed to such a degree that the Western powers may want to reconsider their whole policy towards Germany and its part in European integration. And the West will not be able to stop at that, for it must view Germany in the framework of a new global policy amid what may prove a crucial phase in fast-moving world affairs.

(Dr. Neumann is professor of government and social sciences at Wesleyan University, where he is also serving as chairman of the Department of History. He is the author of the *Headline Series* book, “Germany: Promise and Perils,” and has contributed a study on German political systems to the recently published volume of Taylor Cole, *Major European Political Systems* [Knopf].)

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